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AN EXISTENCE RESULT FOR THE INFINITY
LAPLACIAN WITH NON-HOMOGENEOUS NEUMANN
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS USING TUG-OF-WAR GAMES
FERNANDO CHARRO, JESUS GARCI´A AZORERO, AND JULIO D. ROSSI
Abstract. In this paper we show how to use a Tug-of-War game to
obtain existence of a viscosity solution to the infinity laplacian with non-
homogeneous mixed boundary conditions. For a Lipschitz and positive
function g there exists a viscosity solution of the mixed boundary value
problem, 8><
>:
−∆∞u(x) = 0 in Ω,
∂u
∂n
(x) = g(x) on ΓN ,
u(x) = 0 on ΓD.
1. Introduction
Our main goal in this paper is to show that Tug-of-War games are a
useful tool to obtain existence of solutions for nonlinear elliptic PDEs. More
concretely, we will show existence of a viscosity solution to
(1.1)


−∆∞u(x) = 0 in Ω,
∂u
∂n
(x) = g(x) on ΓN ,
u(x) = 0 on ΓD,
with g > 0 and Lipschitz. Here Ω is a bounded, convex and smooth domain,
ΓN a subdomain of ∂Ω, and ΓD = ∂Ω \ ΓN .
We have to emphasize that the proof of the existence of a solution of
(1.1) is not trivial. Indeed, if we want to use PDE methods we realize that
the problem is not variational and moreover, it is not clear if there is a
maximum (or comparison) principle for viscosity solutions to this problem,
therefore Perron’s method is not applicable. Furthermore, this problem is
not the limit as p → ∞ of the natural mixed boundary value problem for
the p−Laplacian, −∆pup = 0 in Ω, up = 0 on ΓD and |∇up|
p−2 ∂up
∂n = g on
ΓN (note that this is the natural Neumann boundary condition associated
to −∆pup). It will be interesting to get a proof of existence for (1.1) using
only PDE tools.
Through this paper we will use the 1−homogeneous version of the infinity
Laplacian, which is the operator that appears naturally in connection with
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game theory. Let us recall that it is given by
(1.2) ∆∞u(x) =
〈
D2u(x)
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
,
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
〉
.
This definition is valid when∇u(x) 6= 0 but it needs some technical extension
when ∇u(x) = 0, see Section 4.
Notice that, formally, ∆∞u is the second derivative of u in the direction
of the gradient. In fact, if u is a C2 function and we take a direction v, then
the second derivative of u in the direction of v is
D2vu(x) =
d2
dt2
∣∣∣∣
t=0
u(x+ tv) =
n∑
i,j=1
∂2u
∂xi∂xj
(x)vivj.
If ∇u(x) 6= 0, we can take v =
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
, and get ∆∞u(x) = D
2
vu(x).
Infinity harmonic functions (solutions to −∆∞u = 0) appear naturally as
limits of p−harmonic functions (solutions to −∆pu = −div(|∇u|
p−2∇u) =
0) and have applications to optimal transport problems, image processing,
etc. See [4], [7], [10] and references therein. In this case it is equivalent to take
the 3−homogeneous version of the infinity Laplacian, namely, ∆∞u(x) =
〈D2u(x)∇u(x),∇u(x)〉. It is known that the problem −∆∞u = 0 with a
Dirichlet datum, u = F on ∂Ω has a unique viscosity solution, (as proved in
[12], and in a more general framework, in [18]). Moreover, it is the unique
AMLE (absolutely minimal Lipschitz extension) of F : ΓD → R in the
sense that LipU (u) = Lip∂U∩Ω(u) for every open set U ⊂ Ω \ ΓD. AMLE
extensions were introduced by Aronsson in [3], see the survey [4] for more
references and applications of this subject.
Tug-of-War games. A Tug-of-War is a two-person, zero-sum game, that
is, two players are in contest and the total earnings of one are the losses of
the other. Hence, one of them, say Player I, plays trying to maximize his
expected outcome, while the other, say Player II is trying to minimize Player
I’s outcome (or, since the game is zero-sum, to maximize his own outcome).
Recently, these type of games have been used in connection with some PDE
problems, see [6], [15], [17], [18]. For the reader’s convenience, let us first
describe briefly the game introduced in [18] by Y. Peres, O. Schramm, S.
Sheffield and D. Wilson. Consider a bounded domain Ω ⊂ Rn, and take
ΓD ⊂ ∂Ω and ΓN ≡ ∂Ω \ ΓD. Let F : ΓD → R be a Lipschitz continuous
function. At an initial time, a token is placed at a point x0 ∈ Ω \ΓD. Then,
a (fair) coin is tossed and the winner of the toss is allowed to move the
game position to any x1 ∈ Bǫ(x0) ∩ Ω. At each turn, the coin is tossed
again, and the winner chooses a new game state xk ∈ Bǫ(xk−1) ∩ Ω. Once
the token has reached some xτ ∈ ΓD, the game ends and Player I earns
F (xτ ) (while Player II earns −F (xτ )). This is the reason why we will refer
to F as the final payoff function. It is considered also a running payoff,
f(x) > 0, defined in Ω, which represents the reward (respectively, the cost)
at each intermediate state x. This procedure gives a sequence of game states
x0, x1, x2, . . . , xτ , where every xk except x0 are random variables, depending
on the coin tosses and the strategies adopted by the players.
NON-HOMOGENEOUS NEUMANN BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 3
Now we want to give a definition of the value of the game. To this end
we introduce some notation and the normal or strategic form of the game
(see [17] and [16]). The initial state x0 ∈ Ω \ ΓD is known to both players
(public knowledge). Each player i chooses an action ai0 ∈ Bǫ(0); this defines
an action profile a0 = {a
1
0, a
2
0} ∈ Bǫ(0) × Bǫ(0) which is announced to the
other player. Then, the new state x1 ∈ Bǫ(x0) (namely, the current state
plus the action) is selected according to the distribution p(·|x0, a0) in Ω. At
stage k, knowing the history hk = (x0, a0, x1, a1, . . . , ak−1, xk), (the sequence
of states and actions up to that stage), each player i chooses an action aik.
If the game ends at time j < k, we set xm = xj and am = 0 for j ≤ m ≤ k.
The current state xk and the profile ak = {a
1
k, a
2
k} determine the distribution
p(·|xk, ak) of the new state xk+1. DenoteHk = (Ω\ΓD)×
(
Bǫ(0)×Bǫ(0)×Ω
)k
,
the set of histories up to stage k, and by H =
⋃
k≥1Hk the set of all histo-
ries. Notice that Hk, as a product space, has a measurable structure. The
complete history space H∞ is the set of plays defined as infinite sequences
(x0, a0, . . . , ak−1, xk, . . .) endowed with the product topology. Then, the fi-
nal payoff for Player I, i.e. F , induces a Borel-measurable function on H∞.
A pure strategy Si = {S
k
i }k for Player i, is a sequence of mappings from
histories to actions, namely, a mapping from H to Bǫ(0) such that S
k
i is
a Borel-measurable mapping from Hk to Bǫ(0) that maps histories ending
with xk to elements of Bǫ(0) (roughly speaking, at every stage the strategy
gives the next movement for the player, provided he win the coin toss, as a
function of the current state and the past history). The initial state x0 and
a profile of strategies {SI , SII} define (by Kolmogorov’s extension theorem)
a unique probability Px0SI ,SII on the space of plays H∞. We denote by E
x0
SI ,SII
the corresponding expectation.
Then, if SI and SII denote the strategies adopted by Player I and II
respectively, we define the expected payoff for Player I as
Vx0,I(SI , SII) =


E
x0
SI ,SII
[F (xτ ) +
∑
i
f(xi)], if the game terminates a.s.
+∞, otherwise.
Analogously, we define the expected payoff for Player II as
Vx0,II(SI , SII) =


E
x0
SI ,SII
[F (xτ ) +
∑
i
f(xi)], if the game terminates a.s.
−∞, otherwise.
The ǫ-value of the game for Player I is given by
uǫI(x0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
Vx0,I(SI , SII),
while the ǫ-value of the game for Player II is defined as
uǫII(x0) = inf
SII
sup
SI
Vx0,II(SI , SII).
In some sense, uǫI(x0), u
ǫ
II(x0) are the least possible outcomes that each
player expects to get when the ǫ-game starts at x0. Notice that, as in [18],
we penalize severely the games that never end.
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If uǫI = u
ǫ
II := uǫ, we say that the game has a value. In [18] it is shown
that under very general hypotheses, that are fulfilled in the present setting,
the ǫ-Tug-of-War game has a value.
Note that it is essential that the running payoff is strictly positive or
identically zero in Ω in order to have a value of the game, see [18] for a
counterexample. This fact imposes the restriction that g must be positive
on ΓN . We have to mention that in [2] the authors propose a suitable mod-
ification of the game that gives existence of a continuous solution assuming
only that the payoff is nonnegative. Uniqueness is only known for strictly
positive (or zero) running payoff (from the results in [18]).
In [18], [17] and [8], the limit as ǫ → 0 is studied and it is proved there
that when the running payoff is of order ǫ2, they consider f(x) = ǫ2a(x),
then u(x) = limǫ→0 uǫ(x) exists and is a solution to

−∆∞u(x) = a(x) in Ω,
∂u
∂n
(x) = 0 on ΓN ,
u(x) = F (x) on ΓD.
Let us to point out that the arguments that we develop here allow to fix
an easily solvable mistake in our previous work [8], see Remark 11.
As we have mentioned our main task here is to obtain a non-homogeneous
Neumann boundary condition, hence we consider a running payoff of the
form
(1.3) f(x) =

 ǫ
g(x)
2
for d(x,ΓN ) ≤ ǫ,
ǫ3 for d(x,ΓN ) > ǫ.
Note that f(x) is strictly positive in Ω and concentrates as ǫ → 0 in a
small strip of width ǫ near ΓN . Also note that our running cost f(x) has
size ǫ × ǫ2 for d(x,ΓN ) > ǫ (this will give a solution to ∆∞u(x) = 0 in
Ω) and ǫ−1 g(x)2 ǫ
2 for d(x,ΓN ) ≤ ǫ (this part will become singular giving
∂u
∂n(x) = g(x) on ΓN when passing to the limit). Finally let us observe that
ǫ2 is the homogeneity associated to a change of scale in the 1-homogeneous
infinity Laplacian, while ǫ is the homogeneity associated with ∂u∂n .
For technical reasons we also have to assume that the final payoff F is
zero, F = 0. This hypothesis is used to find the estimates for uǫ collected in
Section 3. We also use there the convexity of Ω.
Note that, since the running payoff is strictly positive, f > 0, and the final
payoff is zero, F = 0, we have that the value of the game is nonnegative,
uǫ ≥ 0.
One of the main properties of the ǫ−values of the game is the so called
Dynamic Programming Principle, that in this case reads as follows:
uǫ(x) =
1
2
sup
y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯
uǫ(y) +
1
2
inf
y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯
uǫ(y) + f(x)
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for every x ∈ Ω¯\ΓD, where Bǫ(x) denotes the open ball of radius ǫ centered
at x and f is given by (1.3).
This property follows from the probabilistic interpretation of the uǫ, since
Player I and Player II have the same probability of winning the coin toss at
the point x, and the running payoff gives the amount received at the point
x. In particular, when the running payoff is zero, the Dynamic Programming
Principle is some kind of mean value property for the ǫ− values of the game.
As we will prove, these ǫ−values converge uniformly (along subsequences)
when ǫ→ 0. The uniform limit as ǫ→ 0 of the game values uǫ is called the
continuous value of the game, that we will denote by u.
One of the most delicate points in this paper is to show that this continuos
value of the game exists. To this end, since the ǫ-values of the game have an
inf-sup or sup-inf expression, we can get the required estimates considering
prescribed strategies for Player II (or Player I) and using a comparison
argument from [18].
In the analysis performed in [18] this convergence result is proved consid-
ering modified dyadic games (on scales ǫ and 2ǫ) that are favorable to one of
the two players and then proving that monotonicity holds for those modified
games. In our case it is difficult to adapt this argument because the size of the
strip where the running payoff is of size ǫ, d(x,ΓN ) ≤ ǫ, changes with ǫ. This
fact implies that the dyadic modifications of the game as in [18] no longer
yield a monotone sequence. Hence we have to introduce a different argument
that is based on a uniform bound for the uǫ (note that this is not immediate
since we have a running payoff with 2ǫ−2maxx f(x) = ǫ
−1maxx g, that is
unbounded as ǫ → 0) together with a modification of the classical Ascoli-
Arzela’s Lemma (taking into account that in general the involved functions
uǫ are not continuous).
From [18], it turns out that u is a viscosity solution to the problem
−∆∞u = 0 in Ω and clearly, u = 0 on ΓD. The second main point of this
paper is to show that in the limit we get the nonhomogeneous Neumann
boundary condition ∂u∂n = g on ΓN .
We have the following result
Theorem 1. Let Ω be a bounded, convex and smooth domain, ΓN a sub-
domain of ∂Ω, and ΓD = ∂Ω \ ΓN . Let g(x) a positive Lipschitz function
defined on ΓN . Consider uǫ the value of the Tug-of-War game described
above. Then, there exists a subsequence, uǫj , that converges uniformly to a
Lipschitz continuous limit u that is a viscosity solution to the mixed boundary
value problem
(1.4)


−∆∞u(x) = 0 in Ω,
∂u
∂n
(x) = g(x) on ΓN ,
u(x) = 0 on ΓD.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we analyze this
Tug-of-War games in an interval (this analysis will provide some insight on
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why the size of the running payoff is the right one), in Section 3 we prove
that the sequence uǫ has a compactness property that allows us to pass
to the limit, and finally in Section 4 we prove that this limit is a viscosity
solution of (1.1). We leave to the Appendix the proof of a compactness result
(a variant of Ascoli-Arzela’s Lemma).
2. The 1− d game
Let us analyze in detail the one-dimensional game and its limit as ǫ→ 0.
We set Ω = (0, 1) and play the ǫ−game. To simplify we assume that
the running payoff is concentrated at one end. That is, we end the game
at x = 0 (with zero final payoff) and we impose a running payoff at the
interval (1− ǫ, 1] of amount ǫg(1)/2 > 0 and, to begin with, zero in the rest
of the interval. Note that, since the running payoff is not strictly positive,
the general result from [18] does not apply and hence we cannot assert the
existence of a value for this game. Nevertheless, in this simple 1 − d case
we can obtain the existence of such value by direct computations. For the
moment, let us assume that there exists a value that we call uǫ and proceed,
in several steps, with the analysis of this sequence of functions uǫ for ǫ small.
All the calculations below hold both for uǫI and for u
ǫ
II .
Step 1. uǫ(0) = 0.
Step 2. uǫ is increasing in x and strictly positive in (0, 1].
Indeed, if x < y then for every pair of strategies SI , SII for Player I and
II beginning at x we can construct strategies beginning at y in such a way
that
xi,x ≤ xi,y
(here xi,x and xi,y are the positions of the game after i movements beginning
at x and y respectively). Indeed, just reproduce the movements shifting
points by y − x when possible (if not, that is, if the jump is too large and
ends outside the interval, just remain at the larger interior position x = 1).
Then, ∑
i
f(xi,x) ≤
∑
i
f(xi,y).
Taking expectations, infimum and supremum, it follows that
uǫ(x) ≤ uǫ(y).
Note that for two sequences of positions xi,x ≤ xi,y (corresponding to the
same sequence coin tosses) we have that the game with the first sequence
ends before the second and the number of times that the position of the
game enters into (1− ǫ, 1] is greater for the second.
Now, we just observe that there is a positive probability of obtaining
a sequence of 1/ǫ consecutive heads (exactly 2−1/ǫ), hence the probability
of reaching the interval where a positive running payoff is paid is strictly
positive. Therefore,
uǫ(x) > 0,
for every x 6= 0.
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Step 3. In this one dimensional case it is easy to identify the optimal
strategies for players I and II: to jump ǫ to the right for Player I and to
jump ǫ to the left for Player II. That is, if we are at x, the optimal strategies
lead to
x→ min{x+ ǫ, 1}
for Player I, and to
x→ max{x− ǫ, 0}
for Player II.
This follows from step 2, where we have proved that the function uǫ is
increasing in x. As a consequence, the optimal strategies follow: for instance,
Player I will choose the point where the expected payoff is maximized and
this is given by min{x+ ǫ, 1},
sup
z∈[x−ǫ,x+ǫ]∩[0,1]
uǫ(z) = max
z∈[x−ǫ,x+ǫ]∩[0,1]
uǫ(z) = uǫ(min{x+ ǫ, 1}),
since uǫ is increasing.
This is also clear from the following intuitive fact: player I wants to max-
imize the payoff (reaching the interval (1 − ǫ, 1]) and player II wants the
game to end as soon as possible (hence pointing to 0).
Step 4. uǫ is constant in every interval of the form (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) for
k = 1, ..., N (we denote by N the total number of such intervals in (0, 1]).
Indeed, from step 3 we know what are the optimal strategies for both
players, and hence the result follows noticing that the number of steps that
one has to advance to reach zero (or the payoff interval (1−ǫ, 1]) is the same
for every point in (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ).
Remark 1. Note that uǫ is necessarily discontinuos at every point of the
form yk = kǫ ∈ (0, 1).
Step 5. Let us call ak := uǫ |(kǫ,(k+1)ǫ). Then we have
a0 = 0,
ak =
1
2
(ak−1 + ak+1),
for every i = 2, ..., N − 1, and
aN =
1
2
(aN−1 + aN ) +
1
2
ǫg(1)
Notice that these identities follow from the Dynamic Programming Prin-
ciple as stated in the introduction.
Using again that from step 3 we know the optimal strategies, that from
step 4 uǫ is constant in every subinterval of the form (kǫ, (k +1)ǫ) and that
there is a final payoff in the last interval of amount ǫg(1)/2, we immediately
get the conclusion.
Remark 2. Note the similarity with a finite difference scheme used to solve
uxx = 0 in (0, 1) with boundary conditions u(0) = 0 and ux(1) = g(1). In
fact, a discretization of this problem in a uniform mesh of size ǫ leads to the
same formulas obtained in step 5.
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Step 6. We have
(2.1) uǫ(x) = ǫg(1)k, x ∈ (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ).
Indeed, the constants
ak = ǫg(1)k
are the unique solution to the formulas obtained in step 5.
Remark 3. Since formula (2.1) is in fact valid for uǫI and u
ǫ
II , this proves
that the game has a value.
Remark 4. Note that uǫ verifies that
0 ≤ uǫ(x)− uǫ(y) ≤ 2g(1)(x − y)
for every x > y with x− y > ǫ.
In this one dimensional case, we can pass to the limit directly, by using
the explicit formula for uǫ (see Step 7 below). However, in the n-dimensional
case there is no explicit formula, and then we will need a compactness result,
which is proved in Theorem 3 (see the Appendix).
Step 7.
lim
ǫ→0
uǫ(x) = g(1)x,
uniformly in [0, 1].
Indeed, this follows from the explicit formula for uǫ in every interval of
the form (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) found in step 6 and from the monotonicity stated in
step 2 (to take care of the values of uǫ at points of the form kǫ, we have
ak−1 ≤ uǫ(kǫ) ≤ ak).
Remark 5. Note that from these results it follows that the functions uǫ are
uniformly bounded for ǫ small, in fact,
0 ≤ uǫ(x) ≤ 2g(1),
for every ǫ small enough.
Remark 6. Note that the limit function
u(x) = g(1)x
is the unique viscosity (and classical) solution to
∆∞u(x) = (uxx(ux)
2)(x) = 0 x ∈ (0, 1),
with boundary conditions
u(0) = 0, ux(1) = g(1).
Remark 7. Notice that an alternative approach to the previous analysis
can be done by using the theory of Markov chains.
Running payoff given by (1.3). In the case we have a running payoff
given by
ǫ
g(1)
2
χ(1−ǫ,1] + ǫ
3,
which is strictly positive in [0.1] and hence by [18] there exists the value of
this game, uǫ.
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Now we can argue almost exactly as before at steps 1 to 5, therefore
we omit details. The only difference is that the running payoff changes the
equations for the ak and we have
a0 = 0,
ak =
1
2
(ak−1 + ak+1) + ǫ
3,
for every i = 2, ..., N − 1, and
aN =
1
2
(aN−1 + aN ) +
1
2
ǫg(1) + ǫ3.
Now we have to modify the previous Step 6. Let us look for a solution
ak of the form
ak = −ǫ
3k2 +Θǫk.
Of course we have
a0 = 0.
For every k = 1, ..., N − 1 we need
ak =
1
2
(ak−1 + ak+1) + ǫ
3,
that is,
−ǫ3k2 +Θǫk =
1
2
(
− ǫ3(k − 1)2 +Θǫ(k − 1)− ǫ3(k + 1)2 +Θǫ(k + 1)
)
+ ǫ3.
Simplifying this expression we get
−ǫ3k2 +Θǫk =
1
2
(
− 2ǫ3k2 − 2ǫ3 + 2Θǫk
)
+ ǫ3,
that holds true for any choice of Θ.
The last equation reads as
aN =
1
2
(aN−1 + aN ) +
1
2
ǫg(1) + ǫ3.
That is,
−ǫ3N2+ΘǫN =
1
2
(
− ǫ3(N −1)2+Θǫ(N −1)− ǫ3N2+ΘǫN
)
+
1
2
ǫg(1)+ ǫ3,
which is equivalent to,
−ǫ3N2 +ΘǫN =
1
2
(
− 2ǫ3N2 + 2Nǫ3 − ǫ3 + 2ΘǫN −Θǫ
)
+
1
2
ǫg(1) + ǫ3.
Hence we need,
0 = 2Nǫ3 − ǫ3 −Θǫ+ ǫg(1) + 2ǫ3.
From this we find the value of Θ, using that ǫN = 1,
Θ = g(1) + 2Nǫ2 + ǫ2 = g(1) + 2ǫ+ ǫ2.
Therefore, we conclude that it holds
uǫ(x) = −ǫ
3k2 +Θǫk, x ∈ (kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ),
with
Θ = g(1) + 2ǫ+ ǫ2,
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and hence, from the explicit formula for uǫ in every interval of the form
(kǫ, (k + 1)ǫ) and using that Θ verifies that limǫ→0Θ = g(1), we conclude
lim
ǫ→0
uǫ(x) = g(1)x,
uniformly in [0, 1].
3. The n-dimensional case: estimates for uǫ
In this section we prove some estimates, based in arguments from game
theory, that allow us to show that uǫ converge uniformly along subsequences
ǫj → 0 to a Lipschitz continuous limit u. We remark again that proving
uniform convergence is not an easy task since uǫ are in general discontinuous
functions, c.f. the previous section.
Notation and description of the setting:
To get an estimate for the sequence {uǫ}, we will use that these functions
are defined as an sup-inf (or equivalently as inf-sup). Let us fix a point x0 in
the domain Ω. Let us also denote by K the maximum of g(x)2 and, in a first
stage of the game, assume that the running payoff is much more favourable
to Player I, and it is given by
(3.1) f(x) =
{
ǫK for d(x, ∂Ω) ≤ ǫ,
ǫ3 for d(x, ∂Ω) > ǫ.
With this new running payoff, we play a first stage of the game which
ends when the position reaches the point x0, with final payoff 0. Once the
position reaches x0, and this happens almost surely, since for this modified
game this point is the natural target for Player I, the game follows as usual,
without any restriction on the strategies and with the original running payoff
and final states (on ΓD).
Main task: Assuming that the modified game starts from a point y0,
to find a bound for the value of the first part of the game, we call it v, in
terms of the distance |x0 − y0|, K and the diameter of Ω but we want it to
be independent of ǫ for ǫ small enough.
For points x in Ω that do not lie in the strip, dynamic programming
principle holds. That is, the value of the game in Ω, v, (we omit the subscript
ǫ to simplify the notation) verifies
(3.2) v(x) =
1
2
sup
Bǫ(x)
v(z) +
1
2
inf
Bǫ(x)
v(z) + ǫ3.
For points x ∈ Ω that are in the strip of width ǫ around ΓN the dynamic
programming principle is different, since the running payoff is much larger,
and the ball of radius ǫ may not be contained in the domain Ω. Therefore,
in this case the dynamic programming principle gives
(3.3) v(x) =
1
2
sup
Bǫ(x)∩Ω
v(z) +
1
2
inf
Bǫ(x)∩Ω
v(z) + ǫK.
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To estimate v we will look for a suitable supersolution. Consider
v(x) = ǫ+ C1|x− x0| − C2ǫ|x− x0|
2.
We want to choose C1 and C2 in such a way that v is a supersolution to
the dynamic programming principle, (3.2)–(3.3), that is, we want to obtain
a ” ≥ ” in both equations.
Case 1. Concerning (3.2), we have
v(x)−
1
2
v
(
x+ ǫ
(x− x0)
|x− x0|
)
−
1
2
v
(
x− ǫ
(x− x0)
|x− x0|
)
= −C2ǫ|x− x0|
2 +
1
2
C2ǫ(|x− x0|+ ǫ)
2 +
1
2
C2ǫ(|x− x0| − ǫ)
2
= C2ǫ
3 ≥ ε3,
taking C2 ≥ 1.
Case 2. We have to check (3.3), and at this point, the geometry of the
domain has to be taken into account. We assume that there exists a constant
c (that only depends on Ω), that bounds the maximum distance from x0 that
can be reached by Player I.
Definition 1. Given a point x0 ∈ Ω we say that it satisfies the transversality
condition with constant c > 0, if and only if for any point y ∈ ∂Ω, y 6= x0,
it holds
(3.4) 〈
y − x0
|y − x0|
, ~n(y)〉 ≥ c
where ~n(y) denotes the unit outwards normal at the point y.
Remark 8. Note that if Ω is strictly convex, there exists a uniform transver-
sality constant c. However, if ∂Ω contains flat pieces, the transversality con-
stant becomes 0 at some points, see Figure 1.
Hence, if we are at a point x in the strip, when we look at the positions in
the ball Bǫ(x) ∩ Ω, the minimum of the distance to x0 is |x0 − x| − ǫ, while
the maximum of this distance is bounded by |x0 − x|+ cǫ. Therefore, to get
an inequality in (3.3), we need to compute
v(x)−
1
2
v
(
x+ cǫ
(x− x0)
|x− x0|
)
−
1
2
v
(
x− ǫ
(x− x0)
|x− x0|
)
= C1|x− x0| − C2ǫ|x− x0|
2 −
1
2
C1(|x− x0|+ cǫ) +
1
2
C2ǫ(|x− x0|+ cǫ)
2
−
1
2
C1(|x− x0| − ǫ) +
1
2
C2ǫ(|x− x0| − ǫ)
2
≥ ǫ
1
2
C1(1− c)−O(ǫ
2)
≥ ǫK.
This indeed holds for ǫ small if we choose C1 =
4
1−cK.
Using a comparison argument, which follows from the proof of Theo-
rem 2.4 in [18], taking C1 =
4
1−cK and C2 = 1, this function v gives a
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bound for v at points y0 such that ǫ < |y0 − x0|,
(3.5)
v(y0) ≤ v(y0) = ǫ+
4
1− c
K|y0 − x0| − ǫ|y0 − x0|
2
≤
(
4
1− c
K + 1
)
|y0 − x0|.
Remark 9. This estimate is valid as long as |y0−x0| > ǫ. Moreover, this is
natural since, as was shown in the previous section, in the one-dimensional
case, v(y0) is bounded from below by a strictly positive constant (depending
on ǫ).
An estimate for u: Let uǫ(x) be a game as described in the introduction.
We have
(3.6) uǫ(y0) ≤ v(y0) + uǫ(x0)
where v is as before. This estimate follows by prescribing that the second
player plays with a strategy in the family S∗II of strategies which consists on
pointing to x0 until the game reaches this position, and then continue the
game from the starting position x0. By simplicity of writing, we will use the
same symbol S∗II to denote the family of such strategies, and any particular
element in this family. For any δ > 0 there exists a particular strategy SδI
for Player I, such that
uǫ(y0) = sup
SI
inf
SII
Vy0,I(SI , SII) ≤ sup
SI
inf
S∗
II
Vy0,I(SI , S
∗
II)
≤ inf
S∗
II
E
y0
Sδ
I
,S∗
II
[
∑
i
f(xi)] + δ.
Notice that the fact that F = 0 and g > 0 implies that, in this case, the
”good strategies” (in the sense that they are close to realize the supremum)
for Player I do not allow to end the game jumping to a point in ΓD. In any
case, if the game ends during this first stage, we trivially obtain that
E
y0
Sδ
I
,S∗
II
[
∑
i≤τ∗
f(xi)] ≤ v(y0) + uǫ(x0).
For the second part of the game, once we arrive to x0, we can fix a quasi-
optimal strategy for Player II, in the set of strategies S∗II , that we denote
by SδII . Calling τ
∗ the first time where the game reaches x0,
uǫ(y0) ≤ inf
S∗
II
E
y0
Sδ
I
,S∗
II
[
∑
i≤τ∗
f(xi) +
∑
i>τ∗
f(xi)] + δ
≤ Ey0
Sδ
I
,Sδ
II
[
∑
i≤τ∗
f(xi)] + E
x0
Sδ
I
,Sδ
II
[
∑
i>τ∗
f(xi)] + 2δ
≤ v(y0) + sup
SI
inf
SII
Vx0,I(SI , SII) + 2δ
= v(y0) + uǫ(x0) + 2δ.
Here we have selected SδI and S
δ
II such that
sup
SI
inf
S∗
II
Vy0,I(SI , S
∗
II) ≤ inf
S∗
II
E
y0
Sδ
I
,S∗
II
[
∑
i
f(xi)] + δ
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Figure 1. Possible states of the modified game.
and
E
x0
Sδ
I
,Sδ
II
[
∑
i>τ∗
f(xi)] ≤ sup
SI
inf
SII
Vx0,I(SI , SII) + δ.
Since δ is arbitrary we conclude (3.6).
When the transversality condition holds, using our previous estimate for
v, we get
uǫ(y0) ≤ uǫ(x0) +
(
4
1− c
K + 1
)
|y0 − x0|.
By a symmetric argument we obtain
(3.7) |uǫ(y0)− uǫ(x0)| ≤
(
4
1− c
K + 1
)
|y0 − x0|,
for every y0, x0 such that |y0 − x0| > ǫ, and such that the transversality
condition in Ω holds. Note that when Ω is strictly convex the transversality
condition holds for every x0, y0 in Ω, assuming |y0− x0| > ǫ. Therefore, our
enemy at this point is that the boundary can have flat pieces (recall that we
have assumed only that Ω is convex). See Remark 8.
In Figure 1 we show possible movements of the first stage of the game
according to Player I wins, xIk+1, or Player II wins, x
II
k+1. Player I tries to
move far away from x0 while Player II aims to reach x0. Notice that when the
domain is strictly convex then Player I can not move a distance ǫ away from
x0 when xk lies in the strip; while this is possible when the boundary ∂Ω
has flat pieces, the risk being the fact that when Player II uses the strategy
of pointing to x0 at every position then the states of the game can be traped
in the strip. Our next task is to extend the estimate to convex domains that
may have flat pieces on its boundary.
If the transversality condition does not hold we argue as follows: we choose
a point x1 in the interior of the domain with the required transversality
condition for y0 and x1 and for x0 and x1. It suffices to take x1 ∈ Ω such
that
|x0 − x1| ≤ C|x0 − y0|, |y0 − x1| ≤ C|x0 − y0|,
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Figure 2. A possible position of x1
and
dist(x1, ∂Ω) ≥ c|x0 − y0|.
In Figure 2, we draw a possible location of x0 and y0 for which the
transversality condition is not satisfied. Note that when pointing to x0
Player II remains in the strip a large number of times. We also depicted
a possible location of the point x1 mentioned above. Note that when playing
with the strategy of pointing to x1 we leave the strip immediately after at
most a finite number (independent of ǫ) of consecutive winnings of Player II.
Then we obtain that there exists a constant C (depending on K and the
geometry of Ω trough the constants in the transversality condition but not
on ǫ) such that
(3.8)
|uǫ(y0)− uǫ(x0)| ≤ |uǫ(x1)− uǫ(y0)|+ |uǫ(x1)− uǫ(x0)|
≤ C|y0 − x0|,
for all y0, x0 such that |y0 − x0| > ǫ.
This estimate allows us to conclude two results:
Lemma 1. Let uǫ be the value of the game described in the introduction,
then there exists a constant C1 (depending on g and Ω but not on ǫ) such
that
(3.9) 0 ≤ uǫ(x) ≤ C1.
Proof. It is enough to use (3.8) twice (if necessary) with y0 an arbitrary
point in Ω and two points x10, x
2
0 ∈ ΓD with |x
1
0 − x
2
0| >> ǫ and recall that
uǫ(x
i
0) = 0 to obtain the desired bound. 
Lemma 2. Let uǫ be the value of the game described in the introduction,
then there exists a constant C2 (depending on g and Ω but not on ǫ) such
that
(3.10) |uǫ(y0)− uǫ(x0)| ≤ C2|y0 − x0|,
for all x, x0 such that |y0 − x0| > ǫ.
Proof. Immediate from (3.8). 
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Remark 10. This result is analogous to Lemma 3.2 in [18]. However, due
to the fact that our running payoff is of order ǫ (much bigger than ǫ2) in
the strip near ΓN we need a different argument for the proof. Also note that
since our running payoff is of order ǫ3 (much smaller than ǫ2) outside the
strip we find as supersolution a cone plus a correction of order ǫ (see (3.5)),
hence Lemma 3.2 in [18] is not a consequence of our results.
Therefore we fall into the hypotheses of the variant of the Ascoli-Arzela’s
compactness lemma (see the Appendix) and we conclude that uǫ converge
uniformly taking a subsequence if necessary. This proves the first part of
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let uǫ denote the value of the game described in the introduc-
tion, then there exists a subsequence ǫj and a Lipschitz continuous function
u, such that
uǫj → u
uniformly in Ω.
Proof. Thanks to Lemmas 1 and 2 we can apply Theorem 3 in the Appendix
with modulus of continuity ω(s) = C2|s|. Hence there is a subsequence
uǫj that converges uniformly in Ω to a limit with the same modulus of
continuity. 
4. The continuous value of the game is a viscosity solution to
the mixed problem
As we have already mentioned in the Introduction, it is shown in [18] that
the continuous value of the game u is infinity harmonic within Ω and, in the
case that ΓD = ∂Ω, it satisfies a Dirichlet boundary condition u = 0 on ∂Ω.
In this paper, we are concerned with the case in which ∂Ω = ΓD ∪ ΓN
with ΓN 6= ∅. Our aim in the present section is to prove that u satisfies an
homogeneous Neumann boundary condition on ΓN , namely
∂u
∂n
(x) = g(x) on ΓN .
For completeness we will include here the full proof of the fact that u is a
solution to
(4.1)


−∆∞u(x) = 0 in Ω,
∂u
∂n
(x) = g(x) on ΓN ,
u(x) = 0 on ΓD,
in the viscosity sense. As stated in the introduction the precise definition of
the 1−homogeneous infinity Laplacian needs some care. We will consider
(4.2) ∆∞u(x) =


〈
D2u(x)
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
,
∇u(x)
|∇u(x)|
〉
, if ∇u(x) 6= 0,
lim
y→x
2
(
u(y)− u(x)
)
|y − x|2
, otherwise.
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In defining ∆∞u we have followed [18]. Let us point out that it is possible
to define the infinity laplacian at points with zero gradient in an alternative
way, as in [13]. However, it is easy to see that both definitions are equivalent.
To motivate the above definition, the starting point is that ∆∞u is the
second derivative of u in the direction of the gradient, as it is said in the
introduction. In points where ∇u(x) = 0, no direction is preferred to take
second derivatives, and then expression (4.2) arises from the second-order
Taylor’s expansion of u at the point x,
2(u(y) − u(x))
|y − x|2
=
〈
D2u(x)
y − x
|y − x|
,
y − x
|y − x|
〉
+ o(1).
We say that, at these points, ∆∞u(x) is defined if D
2u(x) is the same in
every direction, that is, if the limit
(u(y)− u(x))
|y − x|2
exists as y → x.
Because of the singular nature of (4.2) in points where ∇u(x) = 0, we
have to restrict our class of test functions. We will denote
S(x) =
{
φ ∈ C2 near x for which ∆∞φ(x) has been defined
}
,
this is, φ ∈ S(x) if φ ∈ C2 in a neighborhood of x and either ∇φ(x) 6= 0 or
∇φ(x) = 0 and the limit
lim
y→x
2
(
φ(y)− φ(x)
)
|y − x|2
,
exists.
Now, using the above discussion of the infinity laplacian, we give the
precise definition of viscosity solution to (4.1) following [5].
Definition 2. Consider the boundary value problem (4.1). Then,
(1) A lower semi-continuous function u is a viscosity supersolution if for
every φ ∈ S(x0) such that u− φ has a strict minimum at the point
x0 ∈ Ω with u(x0) = φ(x0) we have: If x0 ∈ ΓN , the inequality
max
{
〈n(x0),∇φ(x0)〉 − g(x0), −∆∞φ(x0)
}
≥ 0
holds, if x0 ∈ Ω then we require
−∆∞φ(x0) ≥ 0,
with ∆∞φ(x0) given by (4.2), and if x0 ∈ ΓD then φ(x0) ≥ 0.
(2) An upper semi-continuous function u is a subsolution if for every
φ ∈ S(x0) such that u−φ has a strict maximum at the point x0 ∈ Ω
with u(x0) = φ(x0) we have: If x0 ∈ ΓN , the inequality
min
{
〈n(x0),∇φ(x0)〉 − g(x0), −∆∞φ(x0)
}
≤ 0
holds, if x0 ∈ Ω then we require
−∆∞φ(x0) ≤ 0,
with ∆∞φ(x0) given by (4.2), and if x0 ∈ ΓD then ψ(x0) ≤ 0.
(3) Finally, u is a viscosity solution if it is both a super- and a subsolu-
tion.
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Let us recall the result that we have at this point: the sequence uǫ contains
a uniformly convergent subsequence (that by simplicity we will denote by
uǫ) with limit a Lipschitz function u. To end the proof of Theorem 1 we
have to identify the problem verified by u.
End of the proof of Theorem 1. The starting point is the Dynamic Program-
ming Principle, which is satisfied by the value of the ǫ−game:
(4.3) 2uǫ(x) = sup
y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯
uǫ(y)+ inf
y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯
uǫ(y)+ǫg(x)χωǫ(x)+2ǫ
3χΩ\ωǫ(x)
for every x ∈ Ω¯\ΓD, where Bǫ(x) denotes the open ball of radius ǫ centered
at x and ωǫ is the small strip near ΓN given by
ωǫ = {x ∈ Ω : d(x,ΓN ) ≤ ǫ}.
Let us check that u (a uniform limit of the subsequence that we still
denote by uǫ) is a viscosity supersolution to (4.1). To this end, consider a
function φ ∈ S(x0) such that u−φ has a strict local minimum at x0, this is,
u(x)− φ(x) > u(x0)− φ(x0), x 6= x0.
Without loss of generality, we can suppose that φ(x0) = u(x0). Let us see the
inequality that these test functions satisfy, as a consequence of the Dynamic
Programming Principle. For a sequence ǫ → 0 we can choose a sequence of
positive numbers η = η(ǫ) = o(ǫ2). Then, by the uniform convergence of uǫ
to u, there exist a sequence xǫ → x0 such that
(4.4) uǫ(x)− φ(x) ≥ uǫ(xǫ)− φ(xǫ)− η(ǫ),
for every x in a fixed neighborhood of x0. From (4.4), we deduce
sup
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
uǫ(y) ≥ max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + uǫ(xǫ)− φ(xǫ)− η(ǫ)
and
inf
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
uǫ(y) ≥ min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + uǫ(xǫ)− φ(xǫ)− η(ǫ).
Then, we have from (4.3)
(4.5)
2φ(xǫ) ≥ max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y)
+ǫg(xǫ)χωǫ(xǫ) + 2ǫ
3χΩ\ωǫ(xǫ)− 2η(ǫ).
The above expression can be read as an aproximated Dynamic Programming
Principle in the viscosity sense.
It is clear that the uniform limit of uǫ, u, verifies
u(x) = 0, x ∈ ΓD.
Hence
φ(x0) = 0, if x0 ∈ ΓD.
In Ω \ ΓD there are two possibilities: x0 ∈ Ω and x0 ∈ ΓN . In the former
case we have to check that
(4.6) −∆∞φ(x0) ≥ 0,
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while in the latter, what we have to prove is
(4.7) max
{∂φ
∂n
(x0)− g(x0),−∆∞φ(x0)
}
≥ 0.
CASE A First, assume that x0 ∈ Ω.
In this case, we just observe that for ǫ small the points x0 and xǫ belong
to Ω \ ωǫ. In addition we can assume that Bǫ(xǫ) ∩ ωǫ = ∅ (considering ǫ
smaller if necessary).
Now we use ideas from [8].
If ∇φ(x0) 6= 0 we proceed as follows. Since ∇φ(x0) 6= 0 we also have
∇φ(xǫ) 6= 0 for ǫ small enough.
In the sequel, xǫ1, x
ǫ
2 ∈ Ω¯ will be the points such that
φ(xǫ1) = max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) and φ(xǫ2) = min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y).
We remark that xǫ1, x
ǫ
2 ∈ ∂Bǫ(xǫ). Suppose to the contrary that there ex-
ists a subsequence x
ǫj
1 ∈ Bǫj(xǫj ) of maximum points of φ. Then, ∇φ(x
ǫj
1 ) =
0 and, since x
ǫj
1 → x0 as ǫj → 0, we have by continuity that ∇φ(x0) = 0, a
contradiction. The argument for xǫ2 is similar.
Hence, since Bǫ(xǫ) ∩ ∂Ω = ∅, we have
(4.8) xǫ1 = xǫ + ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
and xǫ2 = xǫ − ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
as ǫ → 0. This can be deduced from the fact that, for ǫ small enough φ is
approximately the same as its tangent plane.
In fact, if we write xǫ1 = xǫ + ǫv
ǫ with |vǫ| = 1, and we fix any direction
w, then the Taylor expansion of φ gives
φ(xǫ) + 〈∇φ(xǫ), ǫv
ǫ〉+ o(ǫ) = φ(xǫ1) ≥ φ(xǫ + ǫw)
and hence
〈∇φ(xǫ), v
ǫ〉+ o(1) ≥
φ(xǫ + ǫw)− φ(xǫ)
ǫ
= 〈∇φ(xǫ), w〉 + o(1)
for any direction w. This implies
vǫ =
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1).
Now, consider the Taylor expansion of second order of φ
φ(y) = φ(xǫ)+∇φ(xǫ) · (y−xǫ)+
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(y−xǫ), (y−xǫ)〉+ o(|y−xǫ|
2)
as |y − xǫ| → 0. Evaluating the above expansion at the point at which φ
attains its minimum in Bǫ(xǫ), x
ǫ
2, we get
φ(xǫ2) = φ(xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
as ǫ→ 0.
Evaluating at its symmetric point in the ball Bǫ(xǫ), that is given by
(4.9) x˜ǫ2 = 2xǫ − x
ǫ
2
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we get
φ(x˜ǫ2) = φ(xǫ)−∇φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2).
Adding both expressions we obtain
φ(x˜ǫ2) + φ(x
ǫ
2)− 2φ(xǫ) = 〈D
2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2).
We observe that, by our choice of xǫ2 as the point where the minimum is
attained, using (4.5), and estimating φ(x˜ǫ2) by maxy∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯ φ(y),
φ(x˜ǫ2) + φ(x
ǫ
2)− 2φ(xǫ)− 2ǫ
3
≤ max
y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + min
y∈Bǫ(x)∩Ω¯
φ(y)− 2φ(xǫ) + 2ǫ
3 ≤ 2η(ǫ).
Therefore, since η(ǫ) = o(ǫ2),
0 ≥ 〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2).
Note that from (4.8) we get
lim
ǫ→0
xǫ2 − xǫ
ǫ
= −
∇φ
|∇φ|
(x0).
Then we get, dividing by ǫ2 and passing to the limit,
0 ≤ −∆∞φ(x0).
Now, if ∇φ(x0) = 0 we can argue exactly as above and moreover, we can
suppose (considering a subsequence) that
(xǫ2 − xǫ)
ǫ
→ v2 as ǫ→ 0,
for some v2 ∈ R
n. Thus
0 ≤ −
〈
D2φ(x0)v2, v2
〉
= −∆∞φ(x0)
by definition, since φ ∈ S(x0).
CASE B Suppose that x0 ∈ ΓN . There are four sub-cases to be consid-
ered depending on the direction of the gradient ∇φ(x0) and the distance of
the points xǫ to the boundary.
CASE 1: If either ∂φ∂n(x0) ≥ g(x0), then
(4.10)
∂φ
∂n
(x0) ≥ g(x0) ⇒ max
{∂φ
∂n
(x0),−∆∞φ(x0)
}
≥ 0,
where
∆∞φ(x0) = lim
y→x0
2
(
φ(y)− φ(x0)
)
|y − x0|2
is well defined since φ ∈ S(x0).
Therefore, we conclude that we can always assume in the sequel (cases
2,3,4) that
∂φ
∂n
(x0) < g(x0)
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and hence we get
(4.11)
2φ(xǫ) ≥ max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + ǫg(xǫ)χωǫ(xǫ)− 2η(ǫ)
≥ max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + ǫ
∂φ
∂n
(xǫ)χωǫ(xǫ)− 2η(ǫ).
CASE 2: lim inf
ǫ→0
dist(xǫ, ∂Ω)
ǫ
> 1, and ∇φ(x0) 6= 0.
Since ∇φ(x0) 6= 0 we also have ∇φ(xǫ) 6= 0 for ǫ small enough. Hence,
since Bǫ(xǫ) ∩ ∂Ω = ∅, we have, as before,
xǫ1 = xǫ + ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
, and xǫ2 = xǫ − ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
as ǫ → 0. Notice that both xǫ1, x
ǫ
2 → ∂Bǫ(xǫ). This can be deduced from
the fact that, for ǫ small enough φ is approximately the same as its tangent
plane.
Then we can argue exactly as before (when x0 ∈ Ω) to obtain that
0 ≤ −∆∞φ(x0).
CASE 3: lim sup
ǫ→0
dist(xǫ, ∂Ω)
ǫ
≤ 1, and ∇φ(x0) 6= 0 points outwards Ω.
Now we observe that if the normal derivative of φ is positive then the
minimum in the ball of radius ǫ is contained in Ω since it is located in the
direction of −∇φ and hence we can argue as before. In fact, we have,
xǫ2 = xǫ − ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
.
Now, consider x˜ǫ2 = 2xǫ − x
ǫ
2 the symmetric point of x
ǫ
2 with respect to xǫ.
We go back to (4.5) and use the Taylor expansions of second order,
φ(xǫ2) = φ(xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
and
φ(x˜ǫ2) = φ(xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ)(x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
to get
2η(ǫ) ≥ min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y)− 2φ(xǫ)
≥ φ(xǫ2) + φ(x˜
ǫ
2)− 2φ(xǫ)
= ∇φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ)(x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ)
+
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉
+
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
= 〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
by the definition of x˜ǫ2. Then, we can divide by ǫ
2 and use (4.13) to obtain
−∆∞φ(x0) ≥ 0.
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CASE 4: lim sup
ǫ→0
dist(xǫ, ∂Ω)
ǫ
≤ 1, and ∇φ(x0) 6= 0 points inwards Ω.
In this case we have,
∂φ
∂n
(xǫ) < 0.
and moreover, since g ≥ 0 (note that the sign condition on g also appears
here),
(4.12)
2φ(xǫ) ≥ max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + ǫg(xǫ)χωǫ(xǫ)− 2η(ǫ)
≥ max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y)− 2η(ǫ).
In this case, for ǫ small enough we have that ∇φ(xǫ) 6= 0 points inwards
as well. Thus,
xǫ1 = xǫ + ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
∈ Ω,
while x2 ∈ Ω ∩Bǫ(xǫ). Indeed,
|xǫ2 − xǫ|
ǫ
= δǫ ≤ 1.
We have the following first-order Taylor’s expansions,
φ(xǫ1) = φ(xǫ) + ǫ|∇φ(xǫ)|+ o(ǫ),
and
φ(xǫ2) = φ(xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ) · (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) + o(ǫ),
as ǫ→ 0. Adding both expressions, we arrive at
φ(xǫ1) + φ(x
ǫ
2)− 2φ(xǫ) = ǫ|∇φ(xǫ)|+∇φ(xǫ) · (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) + o(ǫ).
Using (4.5), the fact that η(ǫ) = o(ǫ2) and dividing by ǫ > 0,
0 ≥ |∇φ(xǫ)|+∇φ(xǫ) ·
(xǫ2 − xǫ)
ǫ
+ o(1)
as ǫ→ 0. We can write
0 ≥ |∇φ(xǫ)| · (1 + δǫ cos θǫ) + o(1)
where
θǫ = angle
(
∇φ(xǫ),
(xǫ2 − xǫ)
ǫ
)
.
For a subsequence ǫj → 0, we can assume that we can pass to the limit and
we get
0 ≥ |∇φ(x0)| · (1 + δ0 cos θ0),
where δ0 ≤ 1, and
θ0 = lim
ǫj→0
θǫj = angle (∇φ(x0), v(x0)) ,
with
v(x0) = lim
ǫj→0
x
ǫj
2 − xǫj
ǫj
.
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Since |∇φ(x0)| 6= 0, we find out (1 + δ0 cos θ0) ≤ 0, and then θ0 = π and
δ0 = 1. Hence all the sequence converges and
(4.13) lim
ǫ→0
xǫ2 − xǫ
ǫ
= −
∇φ
|∇φ|
(x0),
or what is equivalent,
xǫ2 = xǫ − ǫ
[
∇φ(xǫ)
|∇φ(xǫ)|
+ o(1)
]
.
Now, consider x˜ǫ2 = 2xǫ − x
ǫ
2 the symmetric point of x
ǫ
2 with respect to
xǫ. We go back to (4.5) and use the Taylor expansions of second order,
φ(xǫ2) = φ(xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
and
φ(x˜ǫ2) = φ(xǫ) +∇φ(xǫ)(x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ) +
1
2
〈D2φ(xǫ)(x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x˜
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
to get again
2η(ǫ) ≥ min
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y) + max
y∈Bǫ(xǫ)∩Ω¯
φ(y)− 2φ(xǫ)
≥ φ(xǫ2) + φ(x˜
ǫ
2)− 2φ(xǫ)
= 〈D2φ(xǫ)(x
ǫ
2 − xǫ), (x
ǫ
2 − xǫ)〉+ o(ǫ
2),
by the definition of x˜ǫ2. Then, we can divide by ǫ
2 and use (4.13) to obtain
−∆∞φ(x0) ≥ 0.
It remains to check that u is a viscosity subsolution of (4.1). This fact
can be proved in an analogous way, taking some care in the choice of the
points where we perform Taylor expansions. In fact, instead of taking (4.9)
we have to choose
x˜ǫ1 = 2xǫ − x
ǫ
1,
that is, the reflection of the point where the maximum in the ball Bǫ(xǫ) of
the test function is attained.
This ends the proof. 
Remark 11. The previous argument fix an inaccuracy in the proof of The-
orem 1 in [8] where it was omitted the error term η(ǫ). This omission was
also pointed out in [2] where the authors develop a regularization technique
which also could fill the gap.
5. Appendix
In this appendix we prove a compactness result, which is a variant of the
classical Ascoli-Arzela’s Lemma. Note that the involved functions need not
be continuous, but they have a uniform modulus of continuity for points
that are not too close.
Theorem 3. Let {uǫ} be a sequence, uǫ : Ω→ R, such that,
(1) uǫ is uniformly bounded, |uǫ(x)| ≤ K for all x ∈ Ω.
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(2) There exists a sequence aǫ → 0, and a uniform modulus of continuity
ω(s) such that, if |x− y| > aǫ, then |uǫ(x)− uǫ(y)| ≤ ω(|x− y|).
Then, there exists a subsequence {uǫj} that converges uniformly in Ω to a
continuous function u(x), that verifies |u(x)− u(y)| ≤ ω(|x− y|).
Proof. First, we find a candidate to be the uniform limit u. Let X ⊂ Ω be a
dense numerable set. By a diagonal procedure we can extract a subsequence
of uǫ, uǫj(x), that converges for all x ∈ X. Let u(x) denote this limit (note
that at this point u(x) is defined for x ∈ X.
Moreover, we have that, given r, s ∈ X, there exists an index j0 such that,
if j > j0 then |r − s| > aǫj , and therefore |uǫj(r)− uǫj(s)| ≤ ω(|r − s|).
Taking limits as ǫ→ 0 we get
|u(r)− u(s)| ≤ ω(|r − s|).
Hence, we can extend u to the whole Ω, continuously (keeping the same
modulus of continuity ω).
Our next step is to prove that uǫ converges to u pointwise. Given z ∈ Ω,
fix, x ∈ X such that |x− z| < δ0, with ω(δ0) < δ/3. We have
|uǫj(z) − u(z)| ≤ |uǫj(z) − uǫj(x)|+ |uǫj(x)− u(x)|+ |u(x)− u(z)|.
For j large enough, |x− z| > aǫj , and then the first term in the right hand
side is less or equal to ω(|x − z|). The same estimate is valid for the third
term and hence,
|uǫj(z)− u(z)| ≤ 2ω(|x− z|) + |uǫj(x)− u(x)| ≤ 2δ/3 + |uǫj (x)− u(x)| ≤ δ,
for j large enough.
Now, we prove uniform convergence. We argue by contradiction. Assume
that there exists a constant M > 0 such that we can find two sequences {ǫj}
and {zj} ⊂ Ω such that
M < |uǫj (zj)− u(zj)|.
Since Ω is compact, we can assume zj → z, and then we obtain,
M < |uǫj(zj)− u(zj)| ≤ |uǫj(zj)− uǫj(z)| + |uǫj(z)− u(z)| + |u(z)− u(zj)|.
The second and third terms go to zero as j →∞, hence to get a contradiction
it is enough to estimate the first term.
Fix s ∈ Ω such that |s− z| < M/4, but |s− z| > aǫj for j > j0. Then we
have,
|uǫj (zj)− uǫj (z)| ≤ |uǫj(zj)− uǫj(s)|+ |uǫj(s)− uǫj(z)|
≤ ω(|zj − s|) + ω(|s− z|) < M/2,
from where we obtain the desired contradiction. 
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